Facing Down
The Soviets
The "Med" was a prime theater of U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the entire Cold War. Bordering countries were the scenes of major confrontations, yet few appreciate the U.S. military role in the region.
By David Colley and Richard Kolb
Vice Adm. Forrest Sherman, deputy chief of naval operations in 1947, called the Mediterranean Sea the "decisive theater of war." And for good reason. Russia's reach extended into the Mediterranean where Communist-backed forces were waging civil war in Greece. Moscow also was intimidating Turkey by massing 300,000 troops along their joint border and making demands. On March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman announced what became known as the Truman Doctrine, aimed at preventing Russia from gaining control of Greece and Turkey. In short, this doctrine proclaimed the U.S. would not allow any form of aggression that would topple the governments of these two critical allies. As Navy Capt. Webb Trammel, attachˇ in Ankara, declared the previous year: Turkey served "as a bridgehead of Western civilization on the Asiatic continent... If we do not hold the Russians on that line, all of the Middle East, and probably all of Asia will soon be forced into the Russian system." To demonstrate its resolve to maintain Turkey's independence, the U.S. sent a flotilla of warships to the Dardanelles and Istanbul in August 1946. The Soviets backed off from their threats and Turkey kept control over the Straits. "With an August decision to deploy a strong fleet to the Mediterranean," wrote naval historians of the USS Missouri's voyage, "it became obvious that the U.S. intended to use her naval and air power to stand firm against the tide of Soviet subversion." James Chace, editor of World Policy Journal, agrees: "With the Truman Administration's willingness to risk a hot war over the control of the Dardanelles, the Cold War had actually begun." The fleet dates back to Sept. 30, 1946, when a U.S. naval task force was placed on a permanent basis in the Med. Fleet designation came Feb. 12, 1950. The Navy's presence in the eastern Med is said to have influenced Moscow profoundly in determining policy in the region. If war came, the 6th Fleet's mission was to blunt and turn back any Soviet naval thrust westward through the Mediterranean. According to Vice Adm. Isaac Kidd, former 6th Fleet commander, this would have been accomplished at any one of six "choke points." They began with the Straits of Gibraltar moving 2,300 miles eastward to the Dardanelles. In between were the sea south of Sardinia and Sicily, the areas between Crete and Greece, Crete and North Africa and Crete and Turkey. By 1971, the 6th Fleet numbered some 45 ships, including three aircraft carriers with escort vessels, four submarines, 200 planes and a force of 25,000 men. A reinforced battalion of 1,800 Marines usually were afloat, too. But defense of the southern flank included more than just a U.S. fleet. The ring of bases included nuclear missile facilities, air bases for nuclear-capable fighters, Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers, patrol planes, supply centers and sensitive listening posts for eavesdropping on Soviet radio and radar transmissions. Rota, Spain, at the western edge of the Mediterranean, was a base for U.S. carriers and Submarine Squadron 16. It also served as an airfield, communications facility, weather and supply station. Spain also was the site of SAC bases at Cartagena, Moron, Torrejon and Zaragoza. The 16th Air Force was headquartered at Torrejon beginning in 1958. Across the Straits of Gibraltar were key bases in Morocco. Port Lyautey, now Kenitra, served as a base for recon flights and Naval Security Group facilities until 1978. Kenitra, Sidi Yahya and Bouknadel were support facilities for the 6th Fleet. Land-based sailors at Port Lyautey were once assigned to the 4th Service Command of the French Foreign Legion. The new 17th Air Force set up at Rabat-Sale in 1953 to control tactical aircraft in Morocco and Libya. Sidi Slimane, Benguerir, Ben Sliman and Nouasseur served as bases until U.S. access to Morocco was lost in 1963. In Italy, Naples was a major naval supply complex and Gaeta was home port to the 6th Fleet (it was at Villefranche, France, 1956-65). Sardinia served as an attack sub base. San Vito Dei Normanni was an intelligence base. Sigonella on Sicily, and La Maddalena, were important Cold War bases, too. From 1948 to 1970, Wheelus AB in Tripoli, Libya, was a critical transport command and training base. It also hosted 17th Air Force HQ for three years. Hellenikon, near Athens, Greece, was an Air Force base and staging area as was Iraklion on Crete. Crete was particularly critical as a listening post. The 6th Fleet used the huge naval base at Souda Bay on Crete and elements of the fleet tied up at Piraeus, the port city near Athens. The U.S. once maintained 27 military installations in Turkey, 22 of which were under Air Force control. A number of these were listening posts to gather electronic data from deep within the Soviet Union. Personnel totaled 7,000 in 1975. Duty in Turkey could be unpleasant. "The climate was cold and damp in that mountain region and our worst enemy was isolation and boredom. As a medic, I often witnessed guys cracking up from the strain and tiresome routine," recalls Jerry Cunningham, who was with TUSLOG (The U.S. Logistics Group) Det. 46 at Karamursel, Turkey, 1963-65. "We were frequently on alert. It seemed like we always lived on the edge of a nuclear war with Russia in those days. But everybody did his job despite the adverse conditions, boredom and stress." Turkish Antalya, Istanbul and Izmir were ports of call for the 6th Fleet. Izmir also was headquarters of NATO's 6th Allied Tactical Air Force. Other crucial bases included Incirlik, Cigli, Dyarbakir, Balkesir, Malatya, Belbasi and Sinop. Jim Ritchie, a radio traffic analyst with TUSLOG Det. 4 at Sinop in 1967, recalls being buzzed by Soviet MiGs. "We were truly on the front lines of the Cold War," Ritchie says. Each year the station crew put up Christmas lights in a different location on base. The change was noticed by Soviet intelligence-gathering trawlers just offshore in the Black Sea. Soon the MiGs would swoop over the station to photograph the lights to determine if they had military significance. Cyprus and Malta were bases for U.S. operations and logistics into the early 1950s. David Dyhouse, a radarman with Patrol Squadron 24 and Heavy Attack Mining Squadron 13 based at Halfar Royal Naval Air Station between 1956-58, recalled: "Our stated mission was to lay mines and patrol the Mediterranean. "Many times while monitoring, the Russian ship's missiles would lock on to us. Although our planes were armed with machine guns, the Russians were equipped with radar-guided missiles. Our only hope of evasion was to fly low and slow. I hate to think we were bait." Several countries harbored remote listening posts. Kagnew Station at Asmara, Eritrea, was an Army Security Agency (ASA) communications outpost. Peshawar Air Station in Pakistan hosted essential monitoring facilities. In Iran, the CIA's Office of SIGINT Operations (OSO) maintained seven sites between 1959 and 1979, when the Shah was deposed. Grover Schmidt, a veteran of 18 "ferret" missions with Com. Unit 32G (VW-2 Det-A) at Port Lyautey from 1953-55, recalls: " We generally flew with a crew of 12, consisting of a pilot, co-pilot, navigator, plane captain -- who generally doubled as the nose gunner -- deck gunner, tail gunner, radio/radar operator, four ECM operators and a radar observer. "The missions could be very risky in more ways than one. In addition to the very real possibility of being shot down by a MiG or ground-to-air missiles, there were problems of weather, mechanical failure, no fuel or fire." Morocco remained a key component of the Mediterranean defense network for 12 years because of its strategic location. "In the event the Russians decided to escalate the Korean War into an atomic conflict, we were told to expect to be nuked first because they knew U.S. stateside bombers wouldn't reach Russia without refueling at our bases," said George Kutzgar who was with the 3906th Air Base Squadron at Sidi Slimane, 1951-52. "We felt our presence served to dissuade the Russians from overt escalation halfway around the world." SAC had devised a deployment program to use shorter-range B-47s. Three bases were built in Morocco for this purpose. "Approximately one-third of the B-47 force was rotated on a monthly basis and kept on 15-minute alert for that entire month. These overseas bases moved the B-47s into effective range of their targets without aerial refueling," said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. James V. Edmundson. Kutzgar continues: "Duty was considered even more dangerous than Korea because of disease, so we were given three points per month for our overseas tour. We came with 350 people, but only had 125 left a year later. We were told that was the highest casualty rate of any unit for that time period, including Korea." In addition to Air Force and Navy aerial reconnaissance, all the services maintained intelligence security units around the Med. The Naval Security Group, U.S. Air Force Security Service and Army Security Agency manned strategically situated stations throughout the region. "There were 1,000 miles of desert on three sides of Wheelus Air Base and 500 miles of Mediterranean to the north. Even though we were on the coast, temperatures reached 110-120 degrees when a sand storm (or ghiblis as they are called) rolled in. All air stopped blowing and you're burning up. First your eyes have trouble with not enough moisture, then the top of your head gets hot, and finally the roof of your mouth burns." Also based at Wheelus was the 580th Air Resupply and Communications Wing (ARCW). "Our crews flew into eastern European countries," says Carl H. Bernhardt, a unit member. The planes regularly flew over Turkey on missions to the Black and Caspian seas where on two occasions 580th DA-16 "Albatross" amphibious aircraft rescued U-2 pilots who ditched when their planes ran out of fuel. On another occasion, an SA-16 picked up a Russian family which was defecting to the West. The 580th also used stripped- down B-29s to drop agents and supplies to guerrilla bands behind the Iron Curtain after lengthy, zigzagging flights to avoid Soviet radar detection. The Wing's 580th Reproduction Squadron was involved in the propaganda war against the Soviet bloc. It had the capacity to print 7 million, two-sided color leaflets in one day, which could be dropped over Communist borders. At Wheelus, too, was the Holding and Briefing Squadron, an "officer-heavy" unit that trained guerrillas to be inserted into enemy nations. Wheelus remained in operation until 1969 when Qadafi seized control. "I helped establish the U.S. Air Force Security Service unit at Peshawar in 1955," said veteran John H. Napier, III. "This listening post was designed to monitor the Soviet missile test range in Central Asia at Tura Taur." Between 1959 and 1969, Peshawar and Lahore were tasked with searching for atomic energy installations along the Trans-Siberian Railway; locating and photographing a large radar facility near the terminal site for missile launchings from Kapustin Yar; and overflying missile test activities at Tyuratam. "My unit was part of SAC's 'Fast Talk' system and broadcast scheduled and unscheduled 'Skyking' messages from Peshawar," remembered Albert Abromitis, a ground radio operator with the 2008th Communications Squadron, 1967-68. "Our presence in Pakistan was never publicized or talked about." While the number of U.S. troops in Italy was halved by 1959, SETAF's firepower increased. Italy became home base to two nuclear missile units, the 559th and 570th Field Artillery Missile (deactivated there in June 1958) battalions at Vicenza. SETAF also maintained two other nuclear missile battalions, the 528th in Turkey and the 558th in Greece. All had the capability of firing nuclear warheads in the event of war. Joseph Sosna, a vet of the 568th Signal Battalion at Vicenza, recalls that "not even many members of Congress knew U.S. troops were in northern Italy. Hence SETAF was known to its members as the 'Soldiers Even The Americans Forgot.'" Under SETAF command was the 110th Aviation Co., which was the only such unit south of the Alps. Louis J. Ponticelli, who was with the 110th at Verona Army Airfield, 1967-70, recalls "there were two attempts to sabotage the aircraft." The 110th was designated to fight as infantry should the need arise. It and the 17th Transportation Detachment were expected to provide their own security in the event of war. But in 1973, the 3rd Bn., 509th Inf. (Airborne) was dispatched to Vicenza "as a visual response to Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean area," according to an official history. The Soviet Mediterranean Flotilla, which drew ships from other fleets, covered the Gibraltar Straits. Its four amphibious vessels carried 500 "black berets" (marines). During one peak period, the squadron sent 62 ships with 18,720 personnel into the Med. In October 1973, it was increased from 60 to 84 ships, outnumbering the 6th Fleet, which was on Defense Condition Three alert for 26 days. Said Adm. Horacio Rivero, Jr., commander of NATO forces in southern Europe in the summer of 1971: "What was traditionally NATO's southern flank has developed into its southern front. The Mediterranean, which was for NATO part of the zone of the interior, a rear area, is now within the battle zone." Indeed, it was. Michael E. Applegate was aboard the USS Intrepid attached to Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 27 in the summer of 1971. He remembers the action in the Med well: "One day while we were at sea, I saw this huge plane off in the distance about 100 feet above the water heading toward our port side. "It was a Russian recon plane with a big red Commie star on its tail. The plane was called 'the Bear' because both its wing span and overall length was more than 160 feet. It then descended and cleared our mast by about 10 to 20 feet at most. Such hazing incidents would become commonplace during our deployment." As indicated earlier, the clash between East and West in the Med began soon after WWII. In August 1946, the U.S. dispatched the carrier USS Franklin Roosevelt, the battleship Missouri and an escort of cruisers and destroyers to Istanbul as a show of force to prevent Soviet meddling in Turkey. "To many, the presence of the USS Missouri in Greek and Turkish waters was one of the most impressive demonstrations of U.S. interests since the Barbary War (1801-05)," says Tony Alessandro, a crewmember on the Missouri in March-April 1946. "She had arrived when there was ominous Russian domination of the Balkans with Yugoslavia being pulled into the Soviet orbit of satellite states." In fact, tensions flared in August 1946, when Yugoslavian fighter planes forced down a U.S. C-47 en route to Trieste and shot down another in which five crewmembers were killed. The city of Trieste, in bordering Italy, was known as the "Trigger City" by U.S. forces stationed there. It was a constant source of friction from the end of WWII until 1954 when the last GIs departed. The core of TRUST (Trieste, U.S. Troops) was the 351st Infantry Regiment. "Every May bloody riots occurred, and all troops were put on alert," recalls Frank A. Lipinski, a vet of Co. A, 1st Bn., 351st. The bloodiest of all disturbances was in the fall of 1953 when 20 civilians died. Exchanges of gunfire occurred as late as 1954. "GIs sometimes had to dodge bullets, grenades or booby traps," remembers Chuck Nobles, with the 351st Tank Company. During the nine years U.S. troops were stationed in Trieste, some 120,000 Army personnel served on occupation duty there. Bluebat lasted 102 days from July 5 to Oct. 25, and involved the entire 6th Fleet -- 70 ships and 40,000 sailors -- as well as 14,357 ground troops. The Composite Air Strike Force and the 322nd Air Division provided air support. The 8,515 soldiers were from the 201st Logistics Command and the 24th Airborne Brigade, built around the 1st Battle Group, 187th Airborne Infantry, in Germany. Some 5,842 Marines ashore came from the 2nd Provisional Marine Force, 2nd Marine Division. Washington's intent: end factional fighting and prevent the country's takeover by radical Arab nationalists supported by Egypt and the Soviets. In response to the U.S. action, Moscow marshaled forces and conducted military maneuvers in the Caucasus Mountains and around the Black Sea. The real target of the intervention was Moscow and its regional allies. This was clearly illustrated by the recollections of a Marine with the artillery platoon of the 1st Bn., 8th Marine Regiment. "My platoon was stationed in a field called 'elephant's tooth,'" related Robert A. Stompoly. "Our guns were initially pointed at Syria, but later when there was some shooting in the rebel quarter, they were turned around and aimed at Beirut." By October, however, the U.S. began to withdraw its troops and the confrontation subsided. The human pricetag for the operation was one U.S. soldier killed -- Sgt. James R. Nettles -- by sniper fire and four other military personnel killed in accidents in what one historian termed "not war, but like war." Meanwhile, on Sept. 2, 1958, an Air Force C-130 strayed into Soviet territory and was shot down by four MiG fighters. The plane was on a routine reconnaissance mission along the Turkish-Armenian border. The incident drew attention because 17 men went down with the plane. It carried a crew of six and 11 members of the U.S. Air Force Security Service who served with Det. 1, 6911th Radio Group Mobile. The downing of the C-130 represented the Air Force's worst loss of life (17 KIA) from a single Cold War shoot-down. But the shoot-downs did not end there. On Dec. 14, 1965, an RB-57 of the 7407th Support Squadron operating from Incirlik was shot down over the southern Black Sea, killing two Americans. Five years later, on Oct. 21, 1970, a U.S. U-8 was shot down over Soviet Armenia. All four crewmembers were recovered. But that tells only part of the story. Lives lost on operational missions were far greater in number. If you went on a patrol in wartime and died in an accidental crash, your death was rightly attributed to that war. It should be no different for the Cold War -- many were not merely training exercises, they were flights directed at an armed enemy. Here are a few examples. In 1952, a Navy P4M-1Q Martin Mercator from Patrol and Naval Com Unit 32 George based at Port Lyautey, ditched east of Cyprus after a surveillance mission over the Black Sea. The twin-engine plane started its mission from Cyprus and flew over Turkey to circle the Black Sea and monitor Soviet electronic transmissions. An engine burned out and it attempted a return to Cyprus, but ran out of fuel just short of the island. All hands made it out of the sinking plane except the commander/pilot Lt. Robert Hager, according to an account by Robert Ottens-meyer in Naval History. "Though no combat was involved," remembered Stanley R. Connell who served aboard the USS Leyte in the eastern Med in 1947, "sacrifices were made in lives. Air Group 7, for example, lost three pilots at sea during fleet exercises. And the Midway and Franklin Roosevelt suffered similar casualties in later crashes." On Dec. 7, 1977, a U-2 crashed during takeoff at Akrotiri, Cyprus, killing five U.S. airmen. Surface ship collisions were a possible hazard, too. In August 1976, the USS Voge collided with a Soviet sub in the Ionian Sea. And on Feb. 12, 1988, the Yorktown and Caron were bumped by Soviet ships off Sevastopol. No fatalities occurred in either case. Perhaps no Cold War unit suffered higher operational casualties than VQ-2. In 1958, eight crewmen died; on Jan. 16, 1959, 16 perished in Turkey. Then on May 22, 1962, in Germany, 26 men died in a crash. Six men went down Nov. 3, 1966, flying a mission from a carrier. An additional 56 squadron members were killed in the '60s. At least 12 crewmen died during the '70s. On Jan. 25, 1987, a plane flying off the Nimitz was lost with seven crewmen. While the 17 men of the 1958 Armenia shoot-down were finally and properly recognized with a memorial at National Security Agency headquarters at Ft. Meade, Md., in 1997, hundreds of others remain unheralded.
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